A multiyear regional risk programming model was used in evaluating the impacts of different environmental policies on cropping systems, input use, nonpoint source pollution, farm income, and risk. A direct expected utility maximizing problem (DEMP) objective with a Von Neuman Morgenstem utility function was used in deriving optimal cropping systems. A biophysical simulation model provided input for the optimization. Three types of policies-taxing, regulating the aggregate, and regulating the per acre level-were studied for two farm inputs-nitrogen and atrazine. It was observed that policies had varied and multiple cross-effects on pollutant loads, farm income, and risk. This information is crucial in developing successful policies toward improving water quality. If an appropriate input policy is chosen, both targeted and nontargeted pollutant loads can be managed. The three policies varied in their effects on pollutant loads and involved tradeoffs in water quality and economic attributes.
or nonexistent spillover effects can result in sub-chastic or deterministic), and (4) the method of optimal levels of emission reduction or ineffective estimating pollutant loading (fixed delivery ratio or economic policies. Studying the cross-effects of variable estimation). Several approaches have been policies aimed at reducing agricultural NPS pollu-used to study the impact of agricultural practices tion can provide better information for local, state, on water quality. In particular, process simulation and federal agencies charged with improving sur-models have been used extensively to assess policy face water.
impacts on water quality. For example, Lovejoy, In the formulating of appropriate water quality Lee, and Beasley (1985) used ANSWERS (Areal policies, information deficiency is identifiable at Nonpoint Source Watershed Environment Reboth the policy and methodological levels. On the sponse Simulator) to evaluate the cost-effectivepolicy side, the implications of policies on nontar-ness of several micro-targeting policies to reduce geted pollutants and farm risk have not always sediment yields in an Indiana watershed. Likewise, been considered. Interpretation of information on Braden et al. (1989) used the SEDEC (SEDiment the nature of simultaneous adjustments in cropping EConomics) model to evaluate optimal spatial sequences, input use levels, substitution in crop-management of sediment in an Illinois watershed. ping systems, profits, and risk facing the producers Phillips et al. (1993) used the EPIC (Erosion Prorequires a holistic framework. On the modeling ductivity Impact Calculator) model to study the side, the use of a direct expected utility risk pro-responses of soil erosion and exports to several gramming framework to optimize cropping sys-tillage and crop rotation practices in Illinois. Fitems over time can capture producer behavior, nally, Kozloff, Taff, and Wang (1992) used the which can lead to better estimation of policy im-AGNPS (Agricultural NonPoint Source pollution) plications on producer risk and water quality pa-model to study the effectiveness of targeting rameters. This is because of the model's lower re-schemes with respect to budget outlays and sediliance on assumptions underlying the distribution ment yields. of stochastic variables. Also at the modeling level,
Other studies have combined simulation models an understanding of the cross-effects of water qual-with mathematical programming routines to adity policies is important for successful policy de-dress water quality issues. For example, Mapp et sign. This study attempts to fill some of these voids al. (1994) used EPIC-PST along with a mathematiin the water quality literature.
cal programming model to study the impact of limThis study uses a multiyear risk programming iting nitrogen use at various levels on the Central model and a biophysical simulator to investigate High Plains. Teague, Bernardo, and Mapp (1995) the economic and environmental implications of also used EPIC-PST along with a farm-level Tartaxing and regulating farm inputs directed toward get-MOTAD model to evaluate income and envireducing nonpoint source pollution from agricul-ronmental tradeoffs. Taylor, Adams, and Miller tural lands. Specifically, we study the effect of se-(1992), used linear programming along with a biolected environmental policies on crop production physical simulator to study the effect of economic decisions, input use, water quality, soil erosion, incentives to offset nonpoint source pollution. producer income, and farm risk in the White River None of the above studies used the Direct ExBasin in Central Indiana. A direct expected utility pected Utility Maximizing (DEMP) framework of maximization formulation was used to model pro-risk analysis. This study estimates economic and ducer behavior. The economic and environmental water quality implications of policy using a risk impacts of taxing nitrogen and pesticide use and programming framework to evaluate alternative restricting their use at the aggregate (entire water-policies related to nitrogen and pesticide use in shed) and per acre levels were analyzed. Responses agriculture. of targeted and nontargeted pollutants, farm income, and risk (variance in income) to various policy instruments were assessed at varying policy The Model intensities.
Farmers in the watershed are assumed to maximize expected utility of wealth under a stochastic enviBackground Literature ronment defined in equation (1):
Water quality studies can be classified based on (1) (1) Max EU(WS), the level of application (watershed level or farm XI level), (2) the level of targeting (broad-based or where U(.) is a Von Neuman Morgenstern utility micro-targeting), (3) the incorporation of risk (sto-function, which is concave, continuous, and twice 
where Hs is the probability of occurrence of the sth The resources allocated to activities are limited state. A negative exponential utility function to an endowment B as an inequality constraint in (W,) = -e-P for p > 0 equation (3): was used in the study, because it represents con-(3) A x -B stant absolute risk aversion (CARA) over changes where, A is the technology matrix. The income in in wealth. The term p is the risk aversion parameach state is net profit from production activities eter calculated as in equation (4):
The activities in the model included crop sequences (continuous corn, corn-soybean, corn-(4) R(xs)= (Cs Xs -rss), alfalfa, and corn-soybean-wheat), input-use levels
X5,~~~ ' '
(low input use, medium input use, and high input use), and tillage (conventional tillage, minimum where, c s represents the product prices and r is the biophysical simulator, the tillage, and no tillage). A biophysical simulator, the per unit cost in inputs of practice (p) under state . Erosion Productivity Impact Calculator (EPIC Erosion Productivity Impact Calculator (EPIC/ Biophysical and production processes involved in WQ 2 ) (Williams et al. 1989) , was used to simulate the system are represented by equation (5), where processes in the crop yields and other biophysical processes in M, represents the production environment facing M, represents the production environment facig equations (5) and (6). Validation of the yields for the farmer (weather, soil conditions, etc.), and (.) e c s each cropping systems (involving corn, soybean, is the relationship involved in activity x,:
is the relationship involved in activity x: wheat, and alfalfa crops) was done for various in-
. put levels and planting dates. Calibration and validation of the results of the EPIC model follow the The nonpoint source pollution loading (N) is procedures used by Foltz et al. (1995) . The pregenerated according to equation (6), where p(.) is dicted yields were validated by comparing them an emission function for pollutants by farm activi-with the actual yields of the region using a regresties: sion analysis. The simulated yields were found to
be reasonable in predicting mean crop yields. The simulated yields were further validated using exThe farm decision-making framework (repre-pert opinion of agronomists (Foltz et al. 1995) . sented by equations [1] through [6] ) is used to To capture stochastic effects of weather and study the impacts of selected nonpoint source pol-time, a set of twenty-five ten-year simulations was lution policies. For the sake of clarity, this frame-performed for each cropping system to develop work is disaggregated into two subsystems: the empirical crop yield distribution by cropping syseconomic decision-making of producers (equations tem, input level, and tillage practice. for each weather seed. A set of constraints on per watershed was studied by perturbing the system acre input use was added to the mathematical using taxing and regulatory policies to study remodel to perform policy simulation. Restriction on sulting changes. We disaggregated the income efaggregate loading of pollutants was also included fects into both the mean and variance to add inforby using a set of equations constraining the total mation on the impact of policies. The impacts were pollutant loads leaving the system. Background in-measured as percentage changes from the baseline. formation on land use and cropped area for coun-Policy instruments evaluated in this study fell into ties in the watershed was obtained from the 1992 three categories: (1) taxing: increase in per unit agricultural census, and the watershed was delin-price of inputs, (2) restricting input use at the ageated using GIS (Geographical Information Sys-gregate level, and (3) restricting input use at the per tems) with GRASS 4.1.
3 acre level. Thus, a total of six policy scenarios The revenues for each ten-year crop sequence (three types on two inputs, nitrogen and atrazine) were calculated using historical price data pub-were considered in this study. The taxing policy lished by USDA in Agricultural Prices. The net attempts to reach a desirable outcome in water margins were discounted using the "All crop price quality through its effect on farm profits, while the index (prices received)" for Indiana, with 1980 as aggregate restriction on inputs at the watershed the base. A complete mathematical system repre-level invokes constraints in allowable rates of polsenting the problem was programmed using the lution for the entire area. The per acre restriction GAMS (General Algebraic Modeling System) lan-limits the producers in their choice of technologies guage developed by Brooke, Kendrik, and Meer-that do not violate limits on the per acre input use. aus (1988) . The risk aversion coefficient was pa-The implications of policy intensities at various rameterized to test its influence on crop plans, but levels were evaluated by parameterizing the the policy analysis was conducted using a single DEMP model. risk aversion parameter.
The mathematical model integrates both crop and water quality information into a direct ex-Results and Discussion pected utility maximization model. This model was used to derive baseline crop production activities Estimates from the EPIC/WQ model (table 1) , and corresponding pollutant loads. The results of show that organic nitrogen in runoff was lowest, the base run were validated for the watershed using compared with all other farming systems, under a data from Indiana Agricultural Statistics (USDA com-alfalfa system with low input use. Nitrates in and Purdue University 1992, various volumes) ag-the runoff water were lowest (2.68 lbs. per acre) in gregated over counties, and an area study in the continuous corn under no till with low input use, in region conducted by USDA/ERS/Resources and contrast to corn-soybean-wheat under no till with Technology Division, (1993). To accomplish this high input use (13.38 lbs.). Nitrogen pollution in validation, the base plans were disaggregated ac-both subsurface and percolate forms was highest in cording to different crops, input use, and tillage. corn-alfalfa rotation with high input use. Exposure These were then area-weighted to derive allocation to higher levels of nitrates in groundwater could be under each in the optimal plan. These area alloca-a cost associated with increased alfalfa acreage in tions were used in comparison to evaluate the va-the region (Foltz, Lee, and Martin 1993). Phospholidity of the base plan for policy analysis. The base rus contaminants were relatively high under a plan performed well in representing the agricul-corn-alfalfa system with high input use. Sediment tural scenario of the region and was comparable to loading was lowest in a com-alfalfa rotation with area studies and regional agricultural statistics. The low input use (conventional till) and highest under deviation in percentage allocation in base plan corn-soybean-wheat with medium input use (minicompared with area statistics and statistics was cal-mum till). culated within 5% for the area under individual
The multiyear cropping and pollution loading crops.
information was used in the farm decision probMean income, variance in income, and pollution lem. It was observed that under risk neutral prefloading were calculated using accounting equa-erences, the optimal solution generated specializations on the optimal variables. The impact of poli-tion in corn-soybean rotation with medium level of cies on agricultural income and water quality in the input use and no tillage (CS-MF-NT). This is because the ranking is based on mean income (without considering the risk involved), and CS-MF-NT under a relative risk aversion coefficient of one area-weighted estimates of 55% of corn, 38.82% of (table 2) showed diversification in cropping activi-soybean, 4.39% of alfalfa, and 0.46% of wheat ties. Increasing the value of the risk aversion co-acreage. The average annual nitrogen use per acre efficient resulted in lesser allocation to cropping was 124.06 lbs., while phosphorus and potassium systems with higher risk and further diversification use were 56.97 lbs. and 91.76 lbs., respectively. in optimal plans. The optimal plan under relative Nearly 38.09, 14.23, and 21.75% of the land were risk aversion of one was more representative of the under no till, minimum till, and conventional till, study area and hence was used as a baseline run for respectively, in the baseline results. policy analysis. A comparison with the results unThe economic and water quality implications of der risk neutrality explains the classical financial the baseline plan are also evaluated. An estimated response to risk through movement along the in-16.46 lbs. of organic nitrogen pollutants per acre come-risk frontier. The baseline results generated was predicted in the runoff water. Nitrate loss in ter, due to shifts in cropping systems toward alfalfa-based cropping, which uses less nitrogen but has higher estimates of percolate nitrogen. The nisubsurface flows was 5.55 lbs. per acre, and loss of trogen tax also resulted in a slight increase in total the mineral nitrogen was 5.73 lbs. per acre. The phosphorus (runoff and sediment) pollution, due to nitrogen loss through percolation below the crop an increase in the area under a cropping system root zone was 29.55 lbs. per acre. The soluble with lesser nitrogen use and phosphorus pollution phosphorus in runoff was estimated at 152.22 lbs. than the baseline levels. and the phosphorus attached to the sediment was
The economic impacts of this policy are pre-3.02 lbs. per acre. Sediment generated in the base-sented in the lower panel of figure 2. As expected, line, as estimated by USLE (Universal Soil Loss the use of nitrogen declined at a constant rate for Equation), was 0.55 tons per acre. Atrazine loading each increase in nitrogen taxation up to a 600% was estimated at 0.192 gms per acre, while the level. A maximum achievable level of reduction alachlor level was 0.233 gms per acre. The dis-was roughly 20% from the baseline, with an elevcounted mean of income stream of the farms was enfold increase in nitrogen price. While atrazine $370 per acre, with a variance of $210 per acre. and alachlor use declined similarly to nitrogen use, The implications of policies span dimensions in the rate of decline in atrazine use was higher than tradeoffs among various forms of pollutants, tar-that of alachlor use in percentage terms. The use of geted and nontargeted contaminants, agricultural phosphorus declined very gradually until a maxiincome, and income risk (variance income). To mum reduction of 1.2% from the baseline was enable a clear understanding of these complexities, reached. The loss in income was almost linear in a graphical representation of the impacts is pre-nitrogen price rise. Risk (measured as variance in sented for each policy scenario. By graphing the income) faced by the farmers decreased because of multidimensional changes into deviational changes a shift in optimal cropping mix with a significant from the baseline, the impacts of various policies drop after the 600% level of tax, until a maximum can be compared. The X axis indicates the level of decrease of 10% was achieved. an increment in policy intensity compared with the Increasing the tax on nitrogen reduced surface baseline. For instance, in the case of a tax on ni-sources of the pollutant but resulted in an increase trogen, at x = 2, the policy intensity is calculated of nitrogen contamination of groundwater. Nontaras 100* (2 + 1) = 300% increase in nitrogen price geted pollutants like pesticides and sediments were from the baseline. The changes in water quality responsive to nitrogen taxing. Because farm inand economic attributes are represented on the Y come declined and groundwater nitrogen contamiaxis as percentage deviations from the baseline.
nation increased under nitrogen taxing, an optimal level of nitrogen taxes can be fixed after accountNitrogen-targeted policies ing for the tradeoffs in water quality benefits. Aggregate nitrogen use restriction. Aggregate The implications of nitrogen-targeted policies on restrictions on nitrogen use showed varying effects agricultural income and water quality are presented on water quality and are presented in figure 2 . With a 40% restriction in nitrogen use, the groundwater runoff water. Response of total phosphorus was nitrogen contamination reduced to a maximum similar to that of nitrogen in groundwater but diflevel of 30%. The levels of these contaminants fered in magnitude. The sediment in runoff water increased for restriction above 30% from the base-was reduced considerably for restriction levels line. Restricting above 20% of nitrogen use from above 20%. The surface and subsurface nitrogen the baseline level reduced pesticide pollution in contaminants remain unchanged until a 40% re- The aggregate restriction in nitrogen use above nitrogen use in aggregate had a significant impact 40% was detrimental to agricultural income. Reon use of all inputs. The use of phosphorus and duction of agricultural NPS pollution can be pesticides decreased under this policy. The effect achieved with restriction in nitrogen use up to on farm income was not significant for restrictions 40%. For restrictions higher than 40%, a rise in less than 40%, after which the income loss was nitrogen contamination of groundwater and in substantial. Agricultural income risk increased by phosphorus levels of surface water was predicted.
10% for a 40% increased restriction and declined
Per acre nitrogen use restriction. Constraining for increases above 50% in nitrogen use.
per acre use of nitrogen restricts entry into the optimal cropping plans of certain technologies us-elevenfold increase in tax, while atrazine pollutants ing high amounts of nitrogen fertilizer. The per declined at an eightfold tax. Nitrogen pollution in acre restriction levels had varying effects on water groundwater increased from the baseline for each quality. While not shown graphically, large shifts increase in atrazine tax. Surface and subsurface in cropping systems occurred for restrictions of 6, nitrogen was unaffected by atrazine taxes for 500% 30, and 54% from the baseline nitrogen use per increases, after which these contaminants inacre. At these levels, changes in technologies and creased. shifts in cropping systems were observed, while The effect of atrazine taxes on input use, agriwater quality improved substantially from the cultural income, and risk are presented in the lower baseline. Under all levels of restriction, a reduction panel of figure 3 . The use of atrazine and alachlor of 32% of phosphorus loading was observed. Es-declined steadily for all levels of taxing. Nitrogen timated soil loss declined by 13% from the base-use declined by 2% for a 100% increase in taxing. line for a 6% restriction level and by 16% for both The use of phosphorus was less affected (2%) by 30 and 54% restriction levels. Pesticide contami-this tax. Farm income declined by approximately a nants declined by more than 10% for a 6% restric-5% level at all tax levels. The risk increased from tion in nitrogen use. The reduction in nitrogen con-the baseline, excepting for a 600% level. tamination of surface and subsurface water (tarIn summary, most of the water pollutants can be geted pollution) was less effective under this effectively reduced with taxing up to a 500% inpolicy type than under the aggregate restriction crease from the baseline. An atrazine tax policy scenario. Significant drops in total nitrogen use by increased nitrogen contaminants in groundwater 5%, in phosphorus by 15%, and in pesticides by because of shifts in cropping systems involving 20% were observed for a 6% restriction from the hhe eolate rogen Risks at the baseline. This 6% restriction in nitrogen use per m a a 5 acre reduced the choice set of available cropping iimum at a 500% tax lel. re-. . _.
n, tion was maximum at a 500% tax level. The resystems and resulted in a 5% drop in total nitrogen tion t used in the entire farm. Though the meanduction in financial risk is due to increasing alloused in the entire farm. Though the mean income cation of a cropping system that uses less atrazine of producers was not severely affected, the risk in ctn o a c ing ssm tat ss less atrazine but has lower financial risk and income. farm income increased substantially for all per acre restrictions.
Aggregate atrazine use restriction. The impact To summarize, only certain levels of per acre on water quality was within 20% of the baseline restrictions were effective in protecting water qual-for restrictions up to 40% from the baseline (figure ity. The most effective restriction level was 30% 4). The phosphorus pollutants declined initially to from the baseline application rates. The per acre 13% and increased to a high of 75% at a 70% level policy was effective in reducing general deteriora-of restriction. It was possible to reduce pesticide tion of water quality only for a certain percentage contamination with higher than 15% restriction in reduction. Similar results were obtained by Mapp use. Estimated soil sediments declined at most reet al. (1994) in the Central High Plains. Under the striction levels, except for 60 and 80%. The inper acre restriction scenario, risk in income was crease at these levels is due to adjustment in crop greatest because of limited adjustments in optimal plans with the entry of a new cropping system. cropping systems.
Surface and subsurface nitrogen pollutants declined for restrictions above 40%. As expected, pesticide use declined at all levels of restriction.
Pesticide-targeted policies
Most of the pollutants declined from their baseline for restrictions above a 20% level. A significant The pesticide-targeted policies were applied to drop in income was observed with restrictions atrazine in this study. The three policies on pesti-higher than 20% from the baseline. The risk in cides were similar in magnitude to those of nitro-income dropped, as did mean farm income, with gen-targeted policies.
restrictions higher than 20% from the baseline. Taxing atrazine. Taxing atrazine pesticide This was due to entry of low-income cropping sysshowed little response for levels below 500% from ters with lower risk. the baseline. Taxing beyond this level resulted in Restricting atrazine use on the aggregate rereductions in levels of phosphorus, pesticides, and duced the use of most farm chemicals. Pesticide sediment loading (figure 3). The reduction in sedi-contamination in both surface and groundwater ments in runoff was constant for each increase in dropped for restrictions greater than 10%. Howtax above 600% in price level. The alachlor level in ever, phosphorus and nitrogen loadings to groundwater dropped by 4% from the baseline level for an water increased to significant levels under this policy. Restricting aggregate atrazine use more nitrogen increased from the base levels. A large than 20% from the baseline was found to drasti-drop in sediments was observed at restriction cally affect farm income and risk. higher than 24% from the baseline and a maximum Per acre atrazine use restriction. The results of reduction of 16% was observed. The pesticide this scenario are not presented graphically but are loading dropped by 16% for restrictions that had discussed. By restricting pesticide use at the per higher than a 36% level from the baseline. acre level, nitrogen contamination in groundwater
There was a major decline in pesticide use for declined at restriction levels of 6 to 25% from the each increase in per acre use restriction. Nitrogen baseline. For higher levels of restriction, percolate use increased for restrictions above 6% and rebaseline. For higher levels of restriction, percolate use increased for restrictions above 6% and re- mained at baseline levels for a 30% restriction. ineffective in reducing pesticide contamination of Farm income stabilized after an initial drop, while water because of a shift to cropping systems that risk in farm income was the highest at the 6 and used less pesticides but with a higher loading rate 30% levels. There were significant adjustments in into runoff water. Most of the pollutants affecting technologies at these levels. water quality increased for restrictions less than In summary, a per acre restriction policy was 30% from the baseline.
Practical Caveat
However, policies targeted toward a single pollutant can have cross effects on other forms of polThe existence of multiple and cross effects among lutants, agricultural incomes, and risk. These impollutants is very important in effluent reduction plications for nontargeted pollutants and farm risk policies. Targeting policies to reduce a particular have not always been considered in previous studpollutant can increase other forms of the pollutant ies. There is also a need to study the nature of or other types of pollutants. Taxation of inputs can simultaneous adjustments in cropping sequences, affect effluent discharges provided a careful choice input use levels, substitution in cropping systems, is made on the tax level based on relative tradeoffs profits, and risks facing the producers in a holistic in the economic and water quality variables. Regu-framework. For this a direct expected utility risk latory policy can also be effective in reducing all programming framework that optimizes cropping pollutants but often entails high monitoring and systems over time can capture producer behavior enforcement costs. Monitoring the pollutants and lead to a better estimation of policy implicathrough regular sampling and incentives for strict tions. This is because of the model's lower reliance compliance with the standards can improve en-on assumptions underlying the distribution of stoforcement. An incentive (penalty) structure for chastic variables. This study attempts to fill some compliance (noncompliance) needs to be devel-of these voids in the water quality literature by oped on the existing institutional structure of farm-studying the economic and environmental crossing.
implications of water quality policies using a direct Another approach is to proceed indirectly expected utility programming framework and biothrough the plan developed by the mathematical physical simulation. modeling. Decisions on the levels of pollutants are
The results of this study show that policies tarmade first and entered into the model. The optimal geted toward a particular pollutant involved plans generated are taken as a target in the crop tradeoffs with nontargeted pollutants, economic remanagement and extension programs. Other regu-turns, and risks facing farmers. Overlooking these latory policies and taxes can be directed to achieve implications can have undesirable spillover effects this target. Compliance to aggregate restrictions (new pollutant problems, increased risk, and so can be achieved through encouraging regional co-forth). Careful analysis of these tradeoffs can lead operation in maintaining water quality. Incentives to cost-effective policies toward protecting water to cooperate arise from a higher disparity in pen-quality. Input price policies, besides directly reducalties between a noncooperative pollution level and ing targeted pollutants, can also reduce certain a cooperative level. The cross effects of the choice nontargeted pollutants but need higher price inof cropping systems on pollutant loads constitute creases to achieve a relatively small impact on waimportant information that needs to be made avail-ter quality. It was also observed that nitrogen tax able to producers in the watershed. Carrying out actually increased groundwater pollution of nitroper acre restrictions involves identification of crop-gen because economic and environmental implicaping systems that have higher pollution potential tions of this policy involved movement along a and regulating allocation to those activities. Again, multidimensional surface involving tradeoffs a penalty system that charges for each acre of re-among attributes. Cropping systems that use lower stricted cropping system can be used to achieve levels of nitrogen but have higher groundwater nithis approach. For example, nitrogen in runoff wa-trogen pollution entered the optimal plan under a ter is high under a corn-soybean-wheat cropping nitrogen tax policy. system with high fertilizer use and no till. By reParticular levels of taxing and restriction of inducing per acre allowable nitrogen loading to 13 put use allowed general improvement in water lbs., those acres under this cropping system can be quality, with less loss in farm income and financial regulated by a higher penalty for each pound above risk than did others. Nonetheless, most policies the allowable limit.
were ineffective in reducing groundwater contamination of nitrogen and in certain cases increased the level. Targeting for per acre reduction in nitroConclusion gen and pesticides decreased certain forms of targeted pollutants but increased the levels of other Water quality deterioration through agricultural nontargeted pollutants. Per acre regulation was NPS pollution is a serious problem facing policy highly effective in achieving substantial reduction makers. Indirect policy instruments that change in-of nonpoint pollution in the watershed. The methput use, cropping systems, and technologies have ods of regulation (per acre or aggregate) had varybeen successfully used as water quality policies. ing effectiveness on water quality. Regulating ag-gregate input use levels was also effective and 
